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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
Respondent

submits that the issue to be resolved

more narrow than that proposed by the Appellant.
the issue for resolution

is

Specifically,

is whether the existing law in Utah,

which does not recognize a tort action in favor of an uninjured
spouse for loss of consortium due to injuries to one's spouse,
should be reversed.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE:
Lori Cruz brought a tort action against Jed Wright for
loss of consortium arising out of injuries to her husband sustained in an automobile accident with Mr. Wright in Utah County
in 1982.

PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT:
Nicholas A. Cruz, husband of appellant, filed a complaint

on

sustained

December

7,

1983, against

in an auto accident

Jed

Wright

in December,

1982.

for

injuries

(R., p. 1)

This complaint was amended on July 10, 1984, to add the claim for
loss of consortium by Lori Cruz.
-1-

(R., p. 36)

Defendant made a

Motion to Dismiss or for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings on
November
50)

1, 1984, to strike the claim of Mrs, Cruz.

(R., p.

The Court granted the defendant's Motion on the first day of

trial on December 10, 1984.

(R., p. 260)

On December 17, 1984,

the jury found for the plaintiff, Mr. Cruz.
judgment

(R., p. 264)

Formal

upon the verdict and the dismissal was entered by the

District Court on January 4, 1985.

(R., p. 269)

her Notice of Appeal on February 1, 1985.

Plaintiff filed

(R., p. 275)

STATEMENT OF FACTS
A jury found

that Jed Wright

proximately

caused

the

injuries of Nicholas A. Cruz in an automobile accident occurring
in Utah County on December 23, 1982.

(R., p. 264)

Respondent

does not deny that Lori Cruz is the wife of Nicholas Cruz but
does deny that any loss of consortium occurred or was proximately
caused by Jed Wright.

(R., p. 39)

As the claim of Mrs. Cruz was dismissed as a matter of
law

without a hearing upon the merits, respondent is unaware of

any other operative facts.

-2-

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Respondent propounds the following arguments in support
of his position:
1.

There

is no question that other states recognize

loss of consortium as a cause of action.

Utah's minority posi-

tion is, however, consistent with the historical development of
the law and is not a minority position

in the sense of being

wrong or outdated.
2.

Legislatures have always been free to change common

law rights subject to particular limitations which the appellant
has failed to establish as applicable.
3.

The doctrine of stare decisis controls this case

and there is no sufficient reason to vary from its application.
4.
damage

rather

Recognition of loss of consortium as an element of
than

an

independent

cause of

action

harmonizes

appellant's alleged inconsistencies in the current law and provides this Court with an alternative resolution less drastic than
overruling prior cases and striking down statutes.
5.

Should this Court choose to overrule the existing

law, the burden

created

upon

this defendant

is sufficient

to

justify prospective application only of the new cause of action.

-3-

ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
Appellant

seeks to overturn the long-standing rule of

law in Utah that loss of consortium is not a cause of action in
one whose spouse was injured in some unfortunate incident with a
tortfeasor.

As explained fully in Appellant's brief, this rule

has existed in Utah since at least 1898.
A close reading
logic may be reduced

of Appellant's

to four steps.

brief

shows that

First, a husband

its

had a

common law right to loss of consortium if the wife was injured,
but the wife had no comparable interest in the husband.

Second,

the legislature recognized the inequality of no right to loss of
consortium

in

the

wife

and

husband's right to recovery.

remedied

it

by

eliminating

the

Third, the legislature exceeded its

authority to abrogate the common law in eliminating the husband's
right.

Therefore,

the

legislative

action

abrogating

the

husband's right to recovery for loss of consortium should be set
aside and both spouses should be made equal before the law by
creating an action for loss of consortium in the wife.
The

logic

several reasons.

of

Appellant

does

not

stand

scrutiny

for

First, it is well-settled that the legislature

may abrogate the common law.

-4-

Second, the legislature's choice of

method

to

remedy

the

inequality

which

existed

with regard to

consortium was clearly within the recognized discretion of the
legislature.

Thirdf there is no compelling reason to reverse the

existing case law upon the point.

These responses are examined

in more detail below.
All

statutory references are to Utah Code Annotated,

1953, as amended.

I.
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF LOSS OP
CONSORTIUM SUPPORTS THE CURRENT UTAH POSITION
Appellant

has

adequately

explained

that

the

Married

Women's Acts, of which Section 30-2-4 is part, were adopted to
remedy

the

inequality

in the law arising

from the common law

doctrine that the wife was the property of the husband and had no
property

interest

legislature

in the husband's

recognized

the

social

support
evil

of

and

society.

The

the common law and

chose to remedy it by denying the action to the husband.

Appel-

lant is correct that other states chose to implement equality by
creating the action in the wife.
The

creation

regard

to consortium

placed

the

state

of

equality

in

husband

by the Utah Legislature

as a leader

-5-

in

and

wife

with

in 1898 actually

establishing

that

equality.

Other

states

maintained

following 1950.

the

unequal

status

until

the

years

It was then that the courts of the District of

Columbia held that a wife could recover for loss of consortium as
could a husband*
App.

1950).

Hitaffer v. Argonne Co,, 183 P.2d 811

As a perusal of the appendix

(D.C.

to the Appellant's

brief shows, at page 34, the dates other states found equality
for consortium are very recent.
The recent finding of equality in the other states, so
heavily relied upon by Appellant, is extremely important to the
resolution of whether Utah's current rule has become dated.

At

least one commentator has concluded that the reason other states
chose to create the action in the wife rather than eliminate the
loss

of

action

consortium
was

so

in

ingrained

the
in

husband
their

was
law

because
that

the

husband's

abrogation of the

husband's action would disrupt their jurisprudence.

Amick, "Who

Should Recover For Loss Of Consortium?", 3 5 Maine L. Rev. 296
(1982) at 301.
If the Court properly considers this issue under the
state of the law today, there is no compelling reason to create
the

right

because

to

seek

recovery

for loss of consortium

in a wife

the justification of the other states, i.e., that the

husband's right is well ingrained

in Utah law, is absent.

The

husbands of Utah have not had such an action since at least 1898,
only two years after statehood.
-6-

Because the historical context of this current case is
completely different from that of the other states at the time
they considered how to best create equality between spouses for
loss of consortium, this Court need not be concerned that the
majority rule is contrary to the current position of Utah law.

II.
THE ENACTMENT OF SECTION 30-2-4 WAS
WITHIN THE AUTHORITY OF THE LEGISLATURE
A.

Correct Rule of Law.
Appellant's argument that the legislature cannot abro-

gate a common law right is simply incorrect.

That argument, if

strictly applied, would obviously lock the law of Utah into an
18th or 19th century concept of jurisprudence.
Utah

adopted

the

common

law through

§68-3-1.

That

statute is clear that the common law is adopted subject "to the
laws of this state".

It was intended from the very beginning of

common law in this State that the legislature could change it.
See, Hatch v. Hatch, 46 Utah 116, 148 P. 1096 (1915).
In fact, legislatures have frequently found it appropriate to eliminate common law rights.

The Utah Legislature has,

in §75-2-113, eliminated the rights of Dower and Curtesy.

-7-

This

Court

had

no

trouble

finding

the

legislature's

authority

to

abrogate Dower in Hilton v. Thatcher 31 Utah 360, 88 P. 20
(1906).

Similarly, §76-1-105 abolishes one's right to be pro-

tected from criminal activity under the common law in favor of a
criminal code based entirely upon statute.
Appellant fails to consider §68-3-2, wherein the legislature makes clear that statutes are to be construed to prevail
over the common law.

Adopted in 1898, this statute reflects a

long existing policy in this state that the common law is subject
to change.

(See Addendum)

Other

states have not had difficulty

power of the legislature

to abrogate common

in finding

law rights.

the
For

example, in Lyon v. Bush, 412 P.2d 662 (Hawaii 1966), the legislature

was recognized

as having

the authority

to abolish the

common law action of breach of promise to marry.

Eighteen states

and the District of Columbia have abolished the common law action
for alienation of affection.
P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983).

See note 3, Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669

Finally, though it has not yet occurred,

the Wyoming Supreme Court has recognized that the Wyoming Legislature may eliminate a consortium claim in the husband or create
one in the wife.

Bates v. Donnafield, 481 P.2d 347 (Wyo. 1971).

-8-

B.

Constitutional Considerations.
The Appellant's statement that the legislature cannot

eliminate a common law right falls short of correctly stating the
law.

Consequently, Appellant attempts to find a prohibition on

abrogation of the common law in the access to courts article of
the Utah Constitution.
The

plain

language of

Article

1, Section

11, makes

clear that the purpose of this section is to insure that the
citizens of the state have access to the court for recognized
legal injury.

There is no expressed intent to lock in existing

rights.
Other

states

access provisions

have

similarly

interpreted

in state constitutions.

their

open

In O'Quinn v. Walt

Disney Productions, Inc., 493 P.2d 344 (Colo. 1972), it was held
that the Colorado Constitution did not prevent the legislature
from affecting recognized rights, but simply provided access to
the courts to enforce rights.

Montana reached the same conclu-

sion long ago in Stewart v. Standard Pub. Co., 55 P.2d 694 (Mont.
1936).

The same interpretation was applied to Oklahoma's con-

stitution in Nash v. Baker, 522 P.2d 1335 (Okla. App. 1974).

-9-

The cases cited by Appellant in support of the proposition that the state constitution open access provision limits
the legislature's power were not decided incorrectly, but improperly relied
13.

upon by the Appellant,

Appellant's brief pp. 10-

Those cases assume and recognize that the causes of action

concerned

exist

in law.

What the cases strike down are arti-

ficial procedural or other barriers to bringing the action.
artificial barriers exist here.

No

To the contrary, the legislature

adopted §30-2-4 to eliminate legal barriers to the full equality
of

women

before

the

founded in common law.

law

by

completely

eliminating

an

action

This step was forward in social progress,

not backward as Appellant suggests.

III.
THERE IS NO APPARENT REASON TO AVOID THE
APPLICATION OF THE RULE OF STARE DECISIS
A.

Stare Decisis in Utah.
As this Court is fully aware, the rule of stare decisis

is intended

to bring

stability and predictability

to the law.

There is no question that in appropriate cases this Court may set
a new direction on some point of law.

-10-

Considerable deference is,

however, due the precedent which is challenged.

See Ramirez v.

Ogden City, 3 Utah 2d 102, 279 P.2d 463 (1955) at 464.
Obviously,

before

overruling

this Court ought to make reference

established

precedent,

to some legal standard

to

determine whether the case is appropriate to enter a new legal
position or whether the rule of stare decisis should prevail.
Utah has not yet fully developed its judicial standard for breaking with the doctrine of stare decisis.

In Austad v. Austad, 2

Utah 2d 49, 269 P.2d 284 (1954), this Court reversed a line of
decisions concerning alimony where the old rule was found to be
unjust, plainly in error, and without "firm footing" in the law.
In Allen v. Board of Education, 120 Utah 556, 236 P.2d
756 (Utah 1951), the Court considered the application of the rule
of stare decisis and established law concerning the power of a
school board.

The Court, at 765, indicated that the application

of stare decisis was in large part dependent upon the nature of
the

question

being

considered.

The

language of

the opinion

indicates that where the question arises out of a legislative
decision, those cases arising

thereunder ought to be followed

until the legislature saw fit to change the rule.
that general

principle, the Court

went on

to

Having stated
reverse

precedent based upon the particular facts of that case.

-11-

former

3.

Applicable Precedent.
That §30-2-4 eliminates loss of consortium as a cause

of action in Utah is a principle well-established
law.

in Utah case

The language of Ellis v. Hathaway, 27 Utah 2d 143, 493 P. 2d

985 (1972), is clear that this statute places husband and wife on
an equal basis by eliminating the common law right of action for
loss of consortium in the husband.
Ellis

does

not

stand

alone.

It

was

followed

recently in Tjas v. Proctor, 591 P.2d 438 (Utah 1979).
husband's
this

claim

for loss of

consortium

was

case, when only the wife was injured.

most

There, a

dismissed,

as in

Corbridge v. M.

Morrin & Son, Inc., 19 Utah 2d 409, 432 P.2d 41 (1967), held that
§30-2-4 barred a husband
wife's

injuries.

from collecting his losses due to his

The court held

that the loss of the wife's

services were a part of her claim against the defendant.

C.

The Current Interpretation of §30-2-4 is Well-Founded.
Appellant's brief fails to show that the standard for

avoiding

the rule of stare decisis in this case has been met.

There is no showing that the interpretation of §30-2-4 in Ellis,
Tjas, or Corbridge is unjust or works some evil in a legal sense.

-12-

The

current

consortium

rule

found

in the cases de-

scribed above arises from a legislative enactment.

That legis-

lative act has been shown above to be within the power of the
legislature.

Certainly, the legislature was aware of how the

court has interpreted §30-2-4.

If such interpretations by this

Court were incorrect or not within the intent of the legislature,
it could have been corrected long ago.
There
equality under
goal.

is no question

that the objective of creating

the law for wives was a legitimate

legislative

Appellant is, in effect, asking this Court to substitute

its judgment for that of the legislature in achieving this goal
of equality under the law.

As the Court articulated in Bradshaw

v. Beaver City, 27 Utah 2d 135, 493 P.2d 643 (1972), this Court
ought not to substitute its judgment for that of the legislature
in picking alternative courses of action unless it is outside the
legislature's authority or the action taken is found to be arbitrary and capricious.
The choice of the legislature to abolish the action to
achieve equality between husband and wife is not arbitrary and
capricious, but is simply a choice between alternative courses of
action.

Because plaintiff

attacks §30-2-4.
1898.

Appellant

is a woman, it is ironic that she

Women did not have the cause of action prior to
is

in

the

position

of

complaining

statute that was adopted to benefit women generally.
-13-

about a

Appellant attempts to find some importance in the fact
that Utah law allows for recovery for loss of consortium

in a

wrongful death case, but does not for a personal injury case.
Appellant's reliance

upon Article XVI, Section 5, of the Utah

Constitution, is peculiar because that language clearly implies
that the legislature may choose to abrogate a right of recovery
for loss of consortium.
uage prohibiting

This implication arises from the lang-

the legislature

from abrogating

the right

to

bring a wrongful death action, thus implying the right to abrogate
ture.

an

action

for damages otherwise

remains

in the legisla-

(See Addendum for text)
The Utah Constitution does not specifically provide for

loss of consortium damages in a wrongful death suit.

Rather, as

Jones v. Carvell, 641 P.2d 105 (Utah 1982), makes clear, recovery
for loss consortium has been allowed in the wrongful death action
of

a child

surrounding

because of

the historical

development

the economic value of a child.

of

the law

Consequently, the

choice of the legislature in addressing consortium differently is
consistent when viewed in light of the historical development of
each position.

That is, it was reasonable for the legislature to

establish equality

in wives by banning

the husband's cause of

action and it was reasonable for Utah law to allow recovery of
loss of consortium upon the death of a child to overcome the fact
-14-

that a child had little economic value under the common method of
measuring damages.
The
acted

allegation by Appellant

inconsistently

also

that the legislature has

ignores the holding

in Tjasf

supra.

Again, the court held therein that while the uninjured

spouse

does not have a claim for loss of consortium, certain elements of
consortium, in this case loss of services of the injured spouse,
were recoverable as part of the loss of the injured party.
Rather

than the Utah position of loss of consortium

being an aberration in American jurisprudence, as the Appellant
suggests, Tjas has been praised by one commentator as representing, perhaps, one of the more enlightened and progressive views
concerning consortium.

See Amick "Who Should Recover For Loss Of

Consortium?" 35 Maine L. Rev. 295 at 310-311.
As Amick

implies, Utah's position

is progressive be-

cause the essence of the current status of the Utah law regarding
loss of consortium
individual

is to recognize

that consortium

interest, but rather a family interest.

is not an
Therefore,

the action for loss of consortium remains in the injured party as
an element of damage rather than a separate cause of action.
The

view

that

loss of

consortium

is an

element

of

damages removes the Appellant's alleged inconsistency between the
wrongful death acts and §30-2-4.
-15-

That is, the damaged

family

interest

can

be recovered

by the

injured

party

as would

the

plaintiff in a wrongful death action.
Respondent suggests that this case presents this Court
with the opportunity to clarify the prior cases discussed rather
than overrule them.

The Court can recognize that the legislature

lawfully acted to eliminate loss of consortium as an individual
action in favor of a family interest which may be an element of
damage solely in the injured party.

This result harmonizes the

Wrongful Death Statute, the Married Women's Acts, Tjas, and the
other cases discussed.
loss

of

consortium

Appellant is then properly left with no

claim,

which

belongs

to

her

husband,

the

injured party.

IV.
SHOULD THE COURT OVERRULE THE CURRENT RULE
OF LAW CONCERNING LOSS OF CONSORTIUM, THE
DECISION SHOULD NOT BE RETROACTIVE TO
INCLUDE THESE PARTIES
The applicable

rules governing

whether

an overruling

decision has retroactive operation was examined by this Court in
Loyal Order of Moose, No. 259 v. County Board of Equalization of
Salt Lake County, 657 P.2d 257 (Utah 1982).
determined

There, the Court

that retroactive operation of an overruling decision

is the usual result.

However, this general rule is not binding
-16-

upon

the

Court

and

the Court

retains discretion

to apply an

overruling decision prospectively where some burden is created.
Should the Court adopt the Appellant's position as the
new law of the state, several factors need to be considered in
determining

the retroactivity of the decision.

Clearly, this

defendant raised a proper motion according to the settled law in
effect at the time of the trial.
as to the good

There is, therefore, no issue

faith of the position taken or of the District

Court's ruling in dismissing the claim.
Appellant asks the Court to only reverse the rule of
Utah law that loss of consortium is not recoverable by the uninjured spouse.

However, this Court, should it decide to reverse

the current Utah law, must go further by determining the nature
of the consortium claim.

For example, some states hold that the

action for loss of consortium is a derivative action arising from
the principal tort.

Consequently, the loss of consortium action

must be joined with the original claim

for purposes of trial.

See Gates v. Foley, 247 So.2d 40 (Fla. 1971); Deems v. Western
Maryland Ry. Co., 231 A.2d 514 (1967).

Other states have held

that the uninjured spouse has a consortium claim separate from

-17-

the injured spouse.
ately.

Therefore, the actions may be tried separ-

See Fuller v. Buhrow, 292 N.W.2d 672 (Iowa 1980).

Guid-

ance is also needed as to the effect of the comparative negligence doctrine upon the claim of the uninjured spouse.
This Respondent

is not in a position procedurally to

anticipate the various incidents of the cause of action should it
be created.

Mere reversal is only the beginning.

It would be an

unfair burden on this Respondent to create rules of joinder and
comparative negligence after the principal claim has been finally
resolved.

Retroactive

application

spectre of double recovery.

of

a

reversal

raises

the

That is, the jury might not have

awarded the husband the same amount of general damages had they
before them the claim of the wife for damage concerning loss of
services and family income.
A very practical burden is that retroactive application
of an overruling decision may apply to persons not insured for
loss of consortium

claims.

The people of this state may have

relied upon the state of the law and exercised prudent judgment
that they need not insure against such claims.

To allow retro-

active application of a new cause of action could

financially

destroy defendants in pending cases who relied on consistency of
the law.
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Respondent again affirms that overruling
law is inappropriate.

the current

However, should the Court choose to create

a new cause of action, the burden upon this Respondent and others
similarly situated is great enough to justify prospective application of any change in the fundamental law of consortium

CONCLUSION
Respondent respectfully submits that the Court should
simply recognize that the legislature was within its authority to
change

the

common law.

This case does, however, present an

opportunity to clarify and refine the law by recognizing consortium

as

party.

an

element

of

damage

which

belongs

to

the

injured

The overruling of prior case law and striking down of

statutes is a drastic legal step which is unnecessary.
The action of the District Court should be affirmed.
DATED this 20th day of June, 1985.
KLPP MID CHRISTIAN, P.C,

L^JM^M^^
D. GARY CHRISTIAN

GREGOR£/>/ SANDERS
Attorneys for Respondent
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ADDENDUM
Constitutional Provisions
All courts shall be openf and every personf for an injury done to
him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by
due course of law, which shall be administered without denial or
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting
or defending

before any tribunal

in this State, by himself or

counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.

Article I, Section 11, Utah Constitution.

The right of action to recover damages for injuries resulting in
death, shall never be abrogated, and the amount recoverable shall
not be subject to any statutory limitation, except in cases where
compensation

for injuries resulting

in death is provided for by

law.

Article XVI, Section 5, Utah Constitution.

Statutes
A wife may receive the wages for her personal labor, maintain an
action therefor in her own name and hold the same in her own

-20-

right, and may prosecute and defend all actions for the preservation and protection of her rights and property as if unmarried*
There shall be no right of recovery by the husband on account of
personal injury or wrong to his wife, or for expenses connected
therewith, but the wife may recover against a third person for
such injury or wrong as if unmarried, and such recovery shall
include expenses of medical treatment and other expenses paid or
assumed by the husband.

Utah^Code Annotated, Section 30-2-4.

The common law of England so far as it is not repugnant to, or in
conflict with, the Constitution of laws of the United States, or
the Constitution or laws of this state, and so far only as it is
consistent with and adapted to the natural and physical conditions of this state and the necessities of the people hereof, is
hereby adopted, and shall be the rule of decision in all of this
state.

Utah Code Annotated, Section 68-3-1.

The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation thereof
are to be strictly construed has no application to the statutes
of this state.

The statutes establish the laws of this state
-21-

respecting

the subjects to which they relate, and their provi-

sions and all proceedings

under them are to be liberally con-

strued with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to
promote

justice.

Whenever

there

is any variance between

the

rules of equity and the rules of common law in reference to the
same matter the rules of equity shall prevail.

Utah Code Annotated, Section 68-3-2.

The estates of dower and curtesy are abolished.

Utah Code Annotated, Section 75-2-113.

Common law crimes are abolished and no conduct is a crime unless
made so by this code, other applicable statute or ordinance.

Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-1-105.
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